What the NYT Missed About PJM—and What States Still Don’t Get.
The real fix for high electricity bills isn’t scapegoating PJM — it’s fixing how we connect clean energy and let smaller resources compete.
I'm responding to “As Energy Costs Surge, Eastern Governors Blame a Grid Manager”, an article by Ivan Penn published in The New York Times on June 10, 2025. A friend shared the piece with me, and since I wrote about PJM just last week (which generated a lot of interest), I’m weighing in again — this time with some broader context.
Right off the bat, I noticed that PJM spokesperson Jeffrey P. Shields is quoted again — the same Mr. Shields who appeared in the WHYY article I commented on previously. And to be fair, I agree with him on this point:
“PJM has no profit motive, no shareholders and no share price. We are fully regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and cannot make any major changes without that body’s approval.”
That’s absolutely true.
But it’s also true that generation companies earn significant profits based on decisions made within PJM’s stakeholder process. Generation and transmission owners show up in force at these stakeholder meetings — which, as the article notes, number over 400 per year and are mostly open to the public.1
Still, the criticism about secrecy isn’t baseless. These meetings aren’t closed-door, but unless you speak PJM’s acronym-heavy language and know which subcommittee is deciding what, and when, it’s easy to be left out of meaningful participation. And even if you do figure it out, chances are you don’t have a vote unless you're a PJM member. So yes, access may be public — but influence is another matter entirely.2
The NYT story quotes some state officials saying PJM “exists mainly to benefit the utility industry.” That may sound like an exaggeration, but there’s a kernel of truth here too. What many policymakers may not realize is how much of PJM’s transmission decision-making is governed not just by the FERC Tariff, but also by the PJM Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement. That agreement gives transmission owners a dominant role in what gets selected for PJM’s Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP).
Read this for more information -https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/about-pjm/newsroom/fact-sheets/pjm-governing-documents-fact-sheet.pdf
Let’s say a state governor wants PJM to connect more solar to the transmission grid. PJM must follow FERC’s interconnection process — that’s a given. But if the state wants PJM to evaluate whether dynamic line ratings (DLRs) could speed up interconnection, PJM can’t do that on its own — unless FERC directs it to.
Without FERC’s Orders, the transmission owner must also agree.3 And what happens next is familiar to many developers: PJM points to the TO, and the TO points back to PJM. I’ve seen this firsthand. Meanwhile, state officials remain on the sidelines, lacking the leverage to push for a better outcome.
There’s one part of the article I do take issue with:
“Power outages have become more frequent because utility equipment had been poorly maintained and was not upgraded for more intense natural disasters linked to climate change.”
That’s not on PJM. PJM doesn’t own or maintain equipment — utilities and asset owners do. It’s like saying the Air Traffic Controller is responsible for an Airline’s maintenance.
PJM’s job is to run markets and ensure reliability. Ideally, asset owners conduct maintenance in spring and fall to prepare for peak summer and winter seasons. But in recent years, peaks are emerging in shoulder seasons — like spring mornings and fall evenings — complicating that logic. That may be contributing to more unplanned outages, but again, it’s not a PJM maintenance issue.
The article focuses heavily on frustration from Democratic governors over PJM’s slow interconnection of renewable projects. It also describes a capacity market deal PJM struck with Pennsylvania’s governor to cap prices — and reveals that Virginia’s Republican governor was upset PJM didn’t consult other states before finalizing it.
That’s where I see a deeper problem. PJM is a multi-state regional transmission organization. Its job is to operate a competitive market, as mandated by FERC — not to individually appease state governments. States are free to pursue their own energy policies, but the market rules must remain uniform and transparent. Otherwise, we end up with fragmented, politically negotiated outcomes that distort the market and undermine long-term investment.
If the PJM state governors are serious about reducing electricity bills for their consumers, they should also focus on enabling more demand response and distributed energy resources (DERs) to participate in PJM’s capacity market.
Source: PJM
PJM recently pushed back the implementation of FERC Order 2222 — a rule designed to allow small-scale resources to aggregate and compete in capacity auctions — from 2026 to 2028.
I suspect most governors haven’t paid attention to this, but that delay matters.
Allowing DERs into the capacity market could help lower prices by increasing competition and reducing reliance on large incumbent generators. Unfortunately, PJM told FERC it wasn’t ready — and FERC accepted that 2028 was the appropriate date. That’s a missed opportunity.
Additionally, PJM has placed a cap on the multi-nodal resources - distributed energy resources that span multiple pricing nodes - 167 MW.4 This RTO cap on multi-nodal resources is another missed opportunity. Not only is the market entry for smaller resources that could lower capacity prices delayed but even if they start, there is a cap on how many are connecting to the PJM grid. I am unsure if the Governors are aware of this multi-nodal cap.
And this isn't just a PJM issue. I have the same concern with MISO, which recently imposed a cap on the number of generator interconnection requests it will study in each queue cycle. That kind of structural throttling creates uncertainty and favors incumbent players.
If states are serious about connecting low-cost clean energy and protecting consumers, both state regulators and RTOs must commit to clear, consistent, and competitive rules — not patchwork deals or finger-pointing.
For more reading -
Emissions in PJM are on a downward trend - https://insidelines.pjm.com/emission-rates-in-pjm-reach-all-time-low/
Source: PJM
Read “Large companies with multiple Affiliates have the ability to collaborate among business segments, using affiliate voting to block (or advance) proposals from reaching higher level committees.” https://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/research/publications/pjm-governance-can-reforms-improve-outcomes/
Read more about PJM stakeholder governance from a research paper perspective here - https://www.eba-net.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/7-Johnson-Lenhart-Blumsack533-546.pdf
There is a 3rd option. Have an agreement with the Transmission Owner. See an example - https://elpc.org/news/breakthrough-agreement-with-ameren-will-accelerate-clean-energy-cut-costs-with-smarter-grid-planning/
Slide 5 - https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/subcommittees/disrs/postings/ferc-order-no-2222-overview.pdf